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Further Attacks and Comments on ‘Security of Two Remote User 
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Raphael Chung-Wei Phan, Member, IEEE, and Bok−Min Goi 
Abstract — We point out that Hsu’s recent cryptanalysis of 
Sun’s remote user authentication scheme is flawed.  We also 
comment on Chien et. al’s scheme and give more practical 
attacks than those presented by Hsu in the same paper1. 
Index Terms — remote user authentication, smart cards, 
cryptanalysis.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
A remote user authentication scheme serves to authenticate 
the legitimacy of remote users over an insecure channel.  In 
2000, Sun [5] proposed an efficient remote user authentication 
scheme using smart cards but this was later shown by Chien et. 
al [2] to only achieve unilateral authentication in that only the 
authentication server (AS) could authenticate the remote user 
and not vice versa.  As a consequence, Chien et. al further 
proposed an improvement.  Recently, Hsu [3] considered the 
security of both these schemes and presented two attacks on 
Sun’s scheme and an attack on Chien et. al’s scheme. 
 In this paper, we comment on Hsu’s results, in particular we 
show that his attacks on Sun’s scheme are flawed.  We also 
present attacks on both Sun’s and Chien et. al’s schemes that 
are more practical compared Hsu’s attack.  Further, we give 
comments on Chien et. al’s scheme. 
II. TWO REMOTE USER AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES 
This section describes Sun’s and Chien et. al’s remote user 
authentication schemes. 
A. Sun’s Scheme 
This scheme basically involves any new user, Ui registering 
with the authentication server, AS, and being issued a smart 
card, SCi and subsequently logging in with the smart card to be 
authenticated by AS.  Denote h as a secure one-way hash 
function, x as the secret key of AS, T as the current time stamp, 
and [.] as a secure  channel.  Then, all steps of the scheme are 
described as follows: 
 
Registration: 
Ui  → AS:   IDi  
AS  → Ui:  [PWi = h(IDi, x)] 
AS  → SCi:  h 
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Login: 
Ui  → SCi:  IDi, PWi  
SCi → AS:  IDi, T, C1 = h(T ⊕ PWi) 
 
Authentication: 
1. If IDi invalid, reject login request. 
2. If T expired, reject login request. 
3. Compute PWi = h(IDi, x). 
4. Compute h(T ⊕ PWi) and check if equal to C1.  If YES, Ui 
is authenticated. 
 
During the Registration phase, the new user, Ui presents his ID 
to the authentication server, AS, who then generates the user’s 
password, PWi by simply hashing the concatenation of the 
user’s ID and AS’s long-term secret key, x.  This password is 
then sent back to Ui through a secure channel.  Further, AS 
also stores details of the hash function, h in the smart card, 
SCi. 
 Now when the user logs in to the system during the Login 
phase, he inputs his ID and password, PWi to this smart card 
which then interacts with the AS by forwarding the user’s ID, 
the current timestamp, T and a computed value, C1 that is the 
result of hashing the exclusive-OR (XOR) of T and PWi. 
 With this, the protocol enters the Authentication phase 
where the AS checks the validity of the IDi and the freshness of 
T, failure of which would result in the login request being 
rejected.  Otherwise, the AS recomputes the password, PWi and 
subsequently recomputes C1 to check with the C1 value 
received from the smart card.  If they match, then the user is 
successfully authenticated. 
B. Chien et. al’s Scheme 
The scheme due to Chien et. al similarly comprise the three 
above phases except that the user is allowed to choose his own 
password and hence gives more user convenience.  In more 
detail: 
 
Registration: 
Ui  → AS:   IDi , PWi  
AS  → SCi:  [Ri = h(IDi ⊕ x) ⊕ PWi , h] 
 
Login: 
Ui  → SCi:  IDi, PWi 
SCi → AS:  IDi, T, C1 = h(Ri ⊕ PWi ⊕ T) 
 
Authentication: 
Performed by AS  ⇒ 
1. If IDi invalid, reject login request. 
2. If T expired, reject login request. 
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3. Compute h( h(IDi ⊕ x) ⊕ T) and check if equal to C1.  If 
YES, Ui is authenticated. 
4. Compute C2 = h( h(IDi ⊕ x) ⊕ T’’ ) and reply with the 
message: 
 
AS  → Ui:  [T’’, C2] 
 
Performed by Ui  ⇒ 
1. Compute h(C1 ⊕ T’’ ) and check if equal to C2.  If YES, 
AS is authenticated. 
 
During the Registration phase, the new user, Ui presents his ID 
as well as a chosen password, PWi to the authentication server, 
AS, who then computes a value Ri which is dependent on the 
user’s ID, AS’ secret key, x and the user’s password.  This is 
stored in the user’s smartcard along with details of the used 
hash function, h. 
During the Login phase, the user inputs his ID and 
password, PWi to his smart card which then interacts with the 
AS by forwarding the user’s ID, the current timestamp, T and a 
computed value, C1 that is the result of hashing the exclusive-
OR of Ri, T and PWi. 
 The protocol now enters the Authentication phase where the 
AS checks the validity of the IDi and the freshness of T, failure 
of which would result in the login request being rejected.  
Otherwise, the AS recomputes the value C1 and checks it with 
the C1 received from the smart card.  If they match, then the 
user is successfully authenticated. 
 Further, the AS computes another value, C2 which is 
dependent on the user’s ID, AS’s secret key, x and the latest 
timestamp, T’’ at that point.  This C2 is then sent back to the 
user who then recomputes C2 and checks for a match in order 
to authenticate AS.  Therefore, Chien et. al’s protocol allows 
for mutual authentication of both parties. 
III. FLAWS IN HSU’S ATTACKS ON SUN’S SCHEME 
In this section, we point out flaws in Hsu’s two password 
guessing attacks on Sun’s scheme.  In particular, Hsu’s off-line 
password guessing attack is an obvious and trivial fact, and 
hence does not constitute an attack at all, while his on-line 
password guessing attack on Sun’s scheme is heavily flawed. 
A. Hsu’s Off-line Password Guessing Attack 
Hsu’s off-line guessing attack requires that the attacker 
eavesdrop during the login phase in order to obtain the value 
of T and C1.  He then needs to guess all possible values of the 
password, PWi, and then verify if h(T ⊕ PWi) equals C1. 
Guessing all possible values of the password, and for each 
guess, checking if it is true is merely an exhaustive search of 
the password space and is an obvious fact and well-known 
weakness of any cryptographic scheme!  Claiming it to be an 
attack is analogous to claiming to have re-invented the wheel.  
It is therefore not considered an attack at all. 
B. Hsu’s On-line Password Guessing Attack 
Hsu’s on-line guessing attack also requires that an attacker 
guesses all possible values of the password, PWi, computing 
the value of C1* = h(T ⊕ PWi) and replacing the original C1 in 
the login phase with C1*.  This is then submitted to AS, and the 
attacker keeps repeating this until AS finally accepts it as valid.   
Besides having the same flaw as the previous off-line attack 
in that it is merely a trivial exhaustive search of the password 
space, this attack also has stronger requirements since an 
attacker must perform an active attack, in contrast to the 
previous which merely required eavesdropping and hence is a 
passive attack.  Furthermore, exhaustively guessing a password 
has only a very small probability of 2−k (where k is the size of 
the password in bits) of being accepted by AS.  After only a 
few unsuccessful guessing attempts, AS would have noticed 
something amiss and blacklisted the attacker! 
In summary, both Hsu’s attacks should be disregarded as 
they are heavily flawed. 
IV. IMPROVED ATTACKS ON SUN’S AND CHIEN ET. AL’S 
SCHEMES 
In this section, we present practical attacks on both Sun’s 
and Chien et. al’s schemes.  Our attacks are more practical in 
the sense that they require only simple eavesdropping and 
hence are passive attacks, in contrast to active attacks that 
require an attacker to interfere with the communicated 
messages, for example Hsu’s parallel session attack [3] on 
Chien et. al’s scheme. 
For this purpose, we recall the three phases of Chien et. al’s 
scheme, as described in subsection II.B.  Hsu’s attack requires 
that the attacker eavesdrop on the communication during the 
login phase, in particular during the message sent from the 
user’s smart card to AS, in order to obtain the values of T and 
C1.  He then masquerades as the user, Ui and generates a new 
login request message to AS by making use of the 
eavesdropped values.  This is an active attack since an attacker 
needs to introduce new messages into the communication. 
We now describe our attack which is a passive attack.  The 
attacker similarly eavesdrops during the login phase, but the 
difference is that he does so during the message sent from the 
user, Ui to the smart card and hence obtains PWi.  With the 
knowledge of this, he can then freely masquerade as Ui in any 
future login.  Since our attack only requires an attacker to 
eavesdrop and not to interfere with any communicated 
messages, it is more practical and an attacker can remain 
undetected. 
Similarly, our attack also applies to Sun’s scheme where the 
attacker merely eavesdrops during the login phase during the 
message sent from Ui to his smart card, and the rest follows as 
in our attack on Chien et. al’s scheme. 
V. FURTHER REMARKS ON SECURITY 
A. Remarks on Chien et. al’s Scheme 
First, we remark that Hsu’s attack on Chien et. al’s scheme 
appears to be sound, and works because parts of different 
messages (in this case C1 and C2) have the same structure − 
both being equal to h( h(IDi ⊕ x) ⊕  timestamp ) − which 
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allows an attacker to reuse a part of a previous message as a 
valid part in a new message.  This is a very well-known 
weakness [4] of authentication schemes that allows for replay 
attacks and should be avoided entirely. 
Also, this scheme is very insecure since both the user’s 
identity, IDi and password, PWi are transmitted in the clear 
both during the registration and the login phases.  This not 
only allows an attacker to eavesdrop and obtain these values, 
but also allows him to modify them according to his liking and 
lead to masquerades and denial of service attacks. 
B. Remarks on Both Schemes 
Both schemes use C1 = h(T ⊕ z) for authentication, where z 
is PWi for Sun’s scheme, while it is Ri ⊕ PWi for Chien et. al’s 
scheme.  Regardless, we observe that both schemes use the 
timestamp, T within the hash function, h and so T is not really 
tied to a unique C1 since different T values with different z 
values could still result in the same T ⊕ z that is input to h and 
so produce the same C1.  T therefore has lost its main objective 
as a “time stamp” since this shows that there is no way to bind 
a certain C1 to a unique T to prove that it was generated only at 
that time.   
For ease of discussion we suppose that the input, T ⊕ z to h 
is simply 3 bits in length.  Then, defining z = z2z1z0 and T = 
T2T1T0, we would have the situation as in Table 1. 
 
TABLE I 
DIFFERENTIAL INPUTS TO HASH FUNCTION 
T2T1T0 T ⊕ Z 
000 012 zzz  
001 012 zzz  
010 012 zzz  
011 012 zzz  
100 012 zzz  
101 012 zzz  
110 012 zzz  
111 012 zzz  
 
 
This simply means that at two different times corresponding 
to different timestamps, T, then the two inputs to h would 
differ by some exclusive-OR (XOR) relationship.  Such 
scenarios are ideal for mounting differential cryptanalysis 
attacks [1] on hash functions. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We have shown that Hsu’s attacks on Sun’s scheme are 
heavily flawed and hence should be disregarded.  We have 
also presented passive attacks on both Sun’s and Chien et. al’s 
scheme which are more practical since an attacker merely 
needs to eavesdrop and does not need to interfere with the 
communicated messages.  Finally, we have given further 
comments on the reasons behind Chien et. al’s insecurity, plus 
remarks on issues that might affect both schemes’ security.  
Both schemes exhibit common weaknesses that should not 
exist in a standard authentication scheme.  We therefore hope 
that our work here will highlight the importance of more 
detailed analysis of authentication schemes against these 
common weaknesses before they can be considered for 
practical applications. 
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